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The Logic of Knights, Knaves, Normals and Mutes 
L. Aszalos * 
Abstract 
R. M. Smullyan wrote in his book about islands, knights and knaves. The 
knights always tell the truth and the knaves axe always lying. Instead of say 
we shall examine the can say modal operator. W e show the soundness and 
the completeness of this logic. 
1 Introduction 
At first we introduce the characters of the puzzles. Then we describe a logical 
language suitable to formulate puzzles. Later we prove soundness and completeness 
of this logic and eventually we show some interesting properties of this logic. 
In Smullyan's famous book [2] the knights always tell the truth. Consequently 
they cannot say false statements. Smullyan does not mention any taboo in his 
puzzles, so we can assume that the knights can say any true statement. For the 
knaves the opposite holds, so they can say any false statement and can not say any 
true statement. We can arrange our information in columns: 
can say 
false statements 
can say no 
false statements 
can say true statements knights 
can say no true statements knaves 
Later Smullyan introduced a third type of islanders: the normals, who some-
times tell the truth and sometimes lie. If we put this type into the table, one entry 
will remain empty. To fill this gap we need a new type of islanders, who can not 
say anything; hence we call them mutes. So the complete table is the following: 
can say 
false statements 
can say no 
false statements 
can say true statements normals knights 
can say no true statements knaves mutes 
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2 Syntax 
In the following we shall use the well-known definition of the syntax of propositional 
logic: -
Definition 1 Let be S a finite set of propositional letters. The set of propositional 
formulae is the smallest set J- such that 
1. ScT. 
2. If Ad F then G T. 
3. If A, Be 7 then (A A B), (A V B) and {A D B) G T. 
In the definition above thé connectives are the usual: (negation), V (disjunc-
tion), A (conjunction) and D (implication). To formulate the puzzles we need to 
express that the person x can say true statements, the person x can say false state-
ments and the person x can say the statement A. For this we introduce Tx, F^ and 
S^yl, respectively. Definition 1. is extended to 
Definition 2 Let beVa finite set. The set of formulae is the smallest set T that 
satisfies 1-3. and 
4. If x G V then Tx G T and F,, G T. 
5. If xeV and Ae F thenSxAe f-
In this definition V is the set of persons, and elements of V will be denoted by 
a; b, ... This definition allows the embedding of Sx in the formulae, so for example 
Sa-iSj,Ta is a legal formula, which means that a can say that b cannot say that a 
can say true statements. 
3 Semantics 
In the propositional logic the prime components are the propositional letters. In 
our logic the truth value of a formula can depend on the type of persons, so the 
formulae describing the type of persons are prime components too. Hence the 
définition of the valuation will be more complicated than usual: 
Definition 3 Let i?s C S, dT C V and dF C V. The valuation tf - {•OS^T^F) 
assigns a truth value to every formula. If the formula A is true in a valuation d 
this is denoted by A. 
. if Pes, iffPetis 
• tfh Tx iff x G tfr 
• isN F® iff x G 
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• - A iff # A 
• ,?(= A A B iff A and ^|= B 
• 4)= AV B iff A or $\=B . 
• A D B iff A or , jf= B 
• ,j|= SXA iff lx and A) or Fx and A) 
A formula A is satisfiable if there exists a valuation d such that $ |= A and: a 
formula A is valid if at every valuation 1?, A. 
In t3 model the sets of knights, knaves, normals and mutes are t?7'ni9;r, ^ f l i p , 
fl dp and fl , respectively. 
4 Sequent Calculus 
In our proofs we shall use the sequent calculus described for example in [I, §48.]. 
We shall use the notations and definitions of this book, but we shall give informally 
the basic definitions for whose are unfamiliar with this topic. We do not need the 
last four rules about quantifiers [1, p. 289], but we need two other rules about can 
say . . . 
r , T x , A —->• 0 ; r ,F x —> A , 0 r . A - ^ T , , © . ; r , —> A, Fx, €> 
r , S x A — 4 0 a n r —> S X A , 0 
We say a sequent T —> 0 is falsifiable, if there exists a valuation such that all 
formulae of T are true and all formulae of 0 are false. 
5 Soundness 
Theorem 4 For each of 12 rules: The sequent written below the line is falsifiable iff 
the sequent or at least one of the two sequents written is above the line is falsifiable. 
Proof. For the first 10 rules this was proven in [1], so we prove the claim only for 
rules of can say. 
If T, SXA —> 0 is falsifiable then there exists a 1} such that all formulae of 
T and SXA are true and all formulae of 0 are false in 1?. If SXA is true then by 
definition either A and Tx are true or A is false and Fx is true. In the first case 
r , T x , A —> 0 , in the other case T,FX —> A,Q is falsifiable. To prove it in other 
direction 
1) If r , Tx, A —> 0 is falsifiable, then there exists a such that all formulae of 
T, Tx and A are true and all formulae of 0 are false in $ and by definition 
SXA is true in d so T, Sx A —> 0 is falsifiable. 
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2) If r , Fx —> A, © is falsifiable, then there exists a d such that all formulae of 
T and Fx are true and all formulae of 0 and A are false in $ and by definition 
S^A is true in d so r , S x A —> 0 is falsifiable. 
It easy to check that ^ SXA iff A and Tx) or ( ^ A and Fi)> the 
proof about other rule is similar. • 
The axioms of the sequent calculus are I\A —> A,Q. This kind of sequent is 
not falsifiable, so it is valid. We can prove a formula A in the sequent calculus if we 
can construct a tree according to the rules such that each path ends in an axiom. 
Since all axiom are valid, we can go.upside-down on the tree line by line and by 
the lemma above (which states that if the sequents above the line are valid then 
the sequent below the line is valid, too) all the sequents in the tree are valid; hence 
A is too. This proves the following theorem: 
Theorem 5 Each provable formula is valid. 
6 Completeness. 
We want to prove that any valid formula is provable. At first we shall show that 
any proof-tree is finite. To do this we define a function: 
Definition 6 On the rank of a formula we understand a natural number such that 
• Rank of propositional letters are 0. 
• If x £ V then the ranks of T̂  and Fx are 0, too. 
• If the rank of A is n, then rank of -\A and SXA are n + 1. 
• If the rank of A is n and the rank of B is m then the rank of A A B, A V B 
and A D B are m + n + 1, so the ranks of subformulae are smaller than the 
rank of the formulae. 
The rank of a sequent and the rank of the set of formulae are the sum of the ranks 
of its formulae. 
Lemma 7 The rank of a sequent above the line is smaller than the rank of the 
sequent below the line. 
Proof. Let us show this only for one of the new rules. For the others the proof is 
similar. If the rank of T, 0 and SXA are n, m and I, respectively, then the rank of 
T, SXA —4 0 , r , Tx, A —• 0 and r, Fx —> A, 0 are n + m + I, n + m + l - 1 
and n + m + I — 1, respectively. • 
When we construct a proof-tree then in each step we reduce the rank of the 
sequents. This can be done finitely many times, because the rank of the original 
formula was finite. This proves the following lemma. 
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Lemma 8 Every proof-tree is finite. 
Theorem 9 Every valid formula is provable. 
Proof. Let us assume that there is a valid formula A which is not provable. Take 
a maximal proof ending with the given formula A. By the lemma above its proof-
tree is finite and since the formula is not provable, one path of the tree does not 
end with an axiom and no rule can be applied here, so this node contains only 
prime components, namely predicate letters, formulae of types T^ and Fx. The 
sequent is not axiom, so the two sets of formulae of this sequent are disjunct, hence 
falsifiable, and we only need to assign the value true to each formula to the left of 
the arrow (antecedent) and the value false to each formula to the right of the arrow 
(succedent). By theorem 4. the sequent below this is falsifiable, too, and repeating 
the process we get the original formula falsifiable, but we assumed that it was valid. 
We get a contradiction because we assumed that this formula was unprovable. • 
7 A puzzle and some properties. 
It is hard to typeset the proof-trees in the original form so we shall use a different 
notation. We typeset 
T,A —> e;r,B —> e 
r ,AvB—>0 
as 
r , B - 0 
r , A - 0 
so the two paths are boxed and positioned vertically. 
This logic is not as nice as the logic of belief or logic of knowledge. For example, 
we do not have here the two common properties T and 4. Fig. 1. contains the 
proofs. The problematic paths are denoted by a star. 
Smullyan did not examined this logic, so no puzzles are for it. After Smullyan 
it is hard to invent new puzzles but we shall try it: We met three islander: A, B 
and C. A said that B cannot say that C is a knight. B said that C cannot say that 
A is a knight. C said that A cannot say that B is a knight. Let us prove that at 
least one of them isn't a knight. We formulate this puzzle by the following formula: 
Sa-.S6(TC A -iFc) A Si,-.Sc(Ta A -.Fa) A SC-.SQ(T6 A -.F6) D -.(Ta A -.Fa) V ->(T6 A -.F6) V 
-i(Tc A ->FC). Without the first step our proof is in Fig. 2. 
We have seen in Fig. 1. that two properties are lacking. This is also true for 
many of usual properties, but the formula SX(A D B) D (SXA D S X B), also known 
as K , is still valid. We prove this in Fig. 3. 
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S qA > Saj4, Fa 
Foj Fa ^ A,A,Ta 
F a j Ta, A A, Ta 
Fa —>• A, A SaA,Tg,A —>• Ta 
S a Aj S a A t Ta 
SaA —y A SaA y SaSaJ4 
—> Sa-A 3 A y 3 
Fig. 1. 
Si,-iSc(Ta A - i F q ) , Sc-iS0(T(, A - 'F 6 ) ,T a ,Tt ,T c ,F a —> ->S6(TC A ->FC), Fa , Fb, Fc 
Si,-.Sc(Ta A -'Fa),Sc->Sa(T i ) A -iF(,) ,T0 ,T6,T c ,Ta ,F c —> F6 ,Fa,Fi„F c 
S 6 - S c ( T a A -.F0) ,S c- .Sa(T6 A ->F(,),Ta,T{,,Tc,Ta -—> ->FC, F&, Fa , F&, Fc 
S6-iS c(Ta A ->Fa), SC-SQ(T6 A -|F6 ) ,Ta ,T ( ) ,T c ,Ta , — » Tc, F6, Fa , Ff,, Fc 
St -S c (T a A -iFa), Sc-iSa(Ti, A -F 6 ) ,Ta ,T 6 ,T c ,T a , —> Tc A ->FC, F(,, Fa>F^, Fc 
S 6 -S c (T a A ->Fa), S c -S a (T 6 A ~<Fb), Ta , T ,̂ Tc, TQ, Tc A ~iFc — • T6, Fa, Ff,, Fc 
Sb->Sc(Ta A -iFa), Sc-iSa(Ti, A -|F i,),Ta,T(,,Tc,Ta — • S6(TC A -iF c), Fa, Fb, Fc 
S6->Sc(Ta A -iFa),S c-iSa(T6 A ->Ff,),Ta,T(,,Tc,Ta, -iSÍ,(Tc A ->FC) —> Fa, Fb, Fc 
Sa-'SftÍTc A -^Fc),S6->Sc(Ta A -iFa) ,S c- iSa(T6 A ->F6) ,T0 ,T6 ,T c —> F a ,F 6 ,F c 
Sa^SftíTc A -iF c ) ,S6 - iS c (Ta A _|Fa), Sc-iSa(Ti, A ->F(,), Ta , -iFa , Tj,, ->FÍ,,Tc, ->FC 
Fig. 2. 
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Fa,A,F a —> A,B,SaB 
Fa,A,Ta,A—>Fa,B,B 
Fai A, Ta,A,B — • Ta , B 
Fa,A,ra,'A—>B,SaB 
S a A , F a , A — • B, S a ß 
S a A , F a —> A D B, SaB 
T a ,F a —> A,B,Fa,A 
Tai A, Ta — > B , F a , A 
SaA,Ta —> B,Fa,A 
SaA,Ta, B • Ta, A 
SoAjTa > A, SaB 
SaA,Ta,B —> B,Fa 
SaA,Ta,B,B —> Ta 
SaA,Ta,B —> S a B 
S a A , T 0 , A D B —> SaB 
S„(A D B),SaA —>• S a B 
S a (A D B) —> S a A D S a B 
S a (A DB)D (SaA D S a B ) 
Fig. 3. 
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